

Chalmers' description of a philosophical zombie (his zombie twin) in *The Conscious Mind*, (Oxford University Press 1996, p. 95):

Molecule for molecule identical to me, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a completed physics, but he lacks conscious experience entirely [...] he is embedded in an identical environment. He will certainly be identical to me *functionally*; he will be processing the same sort of information, reacting in a similar way to inputs, with his internal configurations being modified appropriately and with indistinguishable behavior resulting [...] he will be awake, able to report the contents of his internal states, able to focus attention in various places and so on. It is just that none of this functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There will be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing it is like to be a Zombie.

Chalmers explains why he is not a zombie; quoted by Dennett in *Sweet Dreams*, (The MIT Press 2006, p.48), reference given as "Chalmers's website: Reply to Searle":

The justification for my belief that I am conscious lies not just in my cognitive mechanisms but also in my direct evidence; the zombie lacks that evidence, so his mistake does not threaten the grounds for our beliefs. (One can also note that the zombie does not have the same beliefs as us, because of the role that experience plays in constituting the contents of those beliefs.)

Daniel Dennett's verdict in *The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies* (*Brainchildren*, Penguin 1998, p. 177):

Show me, please, why the zombie hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously, and I will apologize handsomely for having ridiculed those who think so. But I want to see an argument, and not just the nudges and mumbles I have provoked by this question in the past. Tradition doesn't cut it. "If you got to ask, you ain't never gonna get to know" doesn't cut it. "Everybody else believes in them" doesn't cut it. Calling me an instrumentalist or an operationalist or a behaviorist – as if these were obviously terms of censure – doesn't cut it. If the philosophical concept of zombies is so important, so useful, some philosopher ought to be able to say why in non-question-begging terms. I'll be curious to see if anybody can mount such a defense, but I won't be holding my breath.